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A Novel Tool for Teaching Property: Starting
With The Questions
Tim Iglesias*
Gertrude Stein asked, “What is the answer?” . . . and when no answer
came she laughed and said: “Then, what is the question?”1

INTRODUCTION
Generally, property law is taught, along with torts and
contracts, as a first-year foundational course introducing students
to the common law.2 While “property law” consists of legal
doctrines, rules, policy justifications, and theoretical perspectives,
this essay focuses on common law property rules and doctrine.3
Professors vary on how much doctrine to include in their courses
and most are eager to delve into policy and deeper issues.
Students often find property law doctrine confusing which
hinders their capacity (and appetite) for digging into policy and
theory. This essay argues that both professors and students
would benefit from an approach that explicitly recognizes the
questions courts are regularly called upon to address in property
cases. It proposes a set of organizing questions as a coherent
framework for teaching students property doctrine, while
simultaneously opening them up to the profound and fascinating
policy and theoretical debates in the field. This framework can be
used with any casebook or teaching method.

* Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. Thanks to my colleagues,
especially David Franklyn, Tristin Green, Alice Kaswan, Richard Sakai, and Michelle
Travis, and to the participants at the 2012 Association for Property, Law, and Society
conference. Special thanks to Ben Barros, Eric Claeys, John Humbach, Peggy Radin,
Carol Rose, Pete Salsich, Shelley Ross Saxer, and Laura Underkuffler for comments on
earlier drafts. I am particularly grateful to Marc Poirier for his extensive comments and
exchanges about this project. Thanks for excellent research and manuscript preparation
assistance by USF law students Christina Crosetti, Maya Kevin Grey, Kristin Nichols,
and Becky Pinger. Of course, any errors are mine.
1 Quoted in Judith D. Fischer, Got Issues? An Empirical Study About Framing
Them, 6 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 2 (2009).
2 To my knowledge, while many law schools have reduced the number of units
dedicated to teaching property law, only Yale Law School has made Property Law an elective.
3 I recognize that an important dimension of contemporary property law includes
statutes that codify, modify, and supersede the common law, as well as novel legislative
enactments creating or revising the property system and property rights. The approach
presented in this essay also applies to statutes. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
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While many have written on how to teach particular
doctrines4 or which doctrines should be included in a property
course,5 few have addressed the problem of teaching a course in
which the fundamental concepts are contested and which
presents numerous other pedagogical challenges (e.g., a broad
array of topics that appear unrelated, still-surviving ancient
doctrines, and the need to translate from a dead language—Norman
French).6 Recent research on teaching property primarily surveys
which topics professors choose to teach with fewer units available.7
Despite all of the debates surrounding property law, there is
an inherent and consistent structure, which can be used to teach
the course in combination with the traditional topic organization
or other formats. The structure is found in the questions that
courts are called upon to answer. The questions are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Is there a “property interest” at issue?
If it is property, what type of property interest is it?
How is this type of property interest created or acquired?
Who “owns” the property interest? How are competing
ownership claims decided?
5. What “property rights” does ownership in this property
entail, and with what limits/scope and duties?
6. What is required to make a valid transfer of this property
interest?

4 See, e.g., John Martinez, A Cognitive Science Approach to Teaching Property
Rights in Body Parts, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 290 (1992).
5 See, e.g., M.C. Mirow, Globalizing Property: Incorporating Comparative and
International Law into First-Year Property Classes, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (2004);
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Why Intellectual Property Belongs in the First-Year Property
Course, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504 (2004).
6 The primary exceptions are: Peter S. Menell & John P. Dwyer, Reunifying
Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 599 (2002) (introducing their new casebook); Steven
Friedland, Teaching Property Law: Some Lessons Learned, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 581 (2002)
(offering alternative ways to teach Property). These articles were part of a special
symposium issue on teaching Property. See also Laura S. Underkuffler, Teaching Property
Stories, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 152 (2005).
7 See, e.g., Joanne Martin, The Nature of the Property Curriculum in ABA-Approved
Schools and its Place in Real Estate Practice, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 385, 393–94
(2009); Roger Bernhardt & Joanne Martin, Teaching the Basic Property Course in U.S.
Law Schools, PROB. & PROP., Sept.–Oct. 2007, at 36, 37–38; Peter Wendel & Robert
Popovich, The State of the Property Course: A Statistical Analysis, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 216,
220 (2006); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall & Jerome M. Organ, The Contemporary Property
Law Course: A Study of Syllabi, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 205, 208, 210 (1997). An exception is
Keith Sealing, Dear Landlord: Please Don’t Put a Price on My Soul: Teaching Property
Law Students That “Property Rights Serve Human Values,” 5 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 35, 106
(2002) (promoting teaching property law while integrating a social justice dimension).
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7. How long does the property interest last? How can the
property interest be terminated?
8. How are property rights in this kind of property enforced?
Courts are consistently presented with these same legal
questions under the rubric of a “Property Law claim.” The varied
answers courts give to these questions create the evident
pluralism in the substance of property doctrine and fuel
theoretical disputes. The framework that I propose helps students
identify the important issues and questions at the outset of their
study of property law so they are prepared to explore, discuss,
advocate for, and develop an understanding of the varied
answers that courts give and their normative bases.
The questions listed above are consistently posed and
answered in property cases. At the same time, the questions do
not presuppose any particular answers; so articulating the set of
questions in no way forecloses the rich policy debate that informs
the questions’ answers.
The idea that a question does not require a particular
answer may seem strange. Certainly, in simple mathematics
each question has one correct answer. However, legal questions
may have several plausible and appropriate answers because
they can be answered from different perspectives. Consider the
story of the Three Stonecutters:
A traveler came across three stonecutters and asked each one in turn:
“What are you doing?” The first replied, “Isn’t it obvious? I am cutting
this stone so that it fits with that one to make a wall.” The second
said, “This is my job. I am making a living to support my family.” The
third looked up with a visionary gleam in his eye and said, “I am
building a cathedral.”8

In this story, the same question elicits three distinct answers
because each stonecutter heard and answered the question from
his own perspective. In the same way, when a case raises a
particular property question,9 courts interpret and answer the
questions from diverse policy perspectives, leading to distinct
rules and doctrines associated with the same question. Each
8 There are many versions of this story. See, e.g., Three Stonecutters: On the Future
of Business Education, HARVARD MAGAZINE (Oct. 15, 2008), http://harvardmagazine.com/
breaking-news/three-stonecutters-the-future-business-education [http://perma.cc/CB7E-NRJB];
see also PETER F. DRUCKER WITH JOSEPH A. MACIARIELLO, MANAGEMENT 258 (Rev. ed.
2005) (making the Parable of the Three Stonecutters famous). While context usually helps
limit and make questions more determinative of the answers that suffice, what counts as
“context” is not a given or obvious.
9 Of course, the parties before the court will try to persuade the court as to which
property question the case raises if they believe that this strategy will give them an advantage.
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answer that a court provides to any of these questions could
reasonably provoke the follow-up query of: “Why?” The courts’
justifications for the answers they provide to the primary questions
inevitably reveal their conceptual and normative commitments.
Thus, property law questions are not determinative of the
answers because courts’ consideration of the questions is itself
shaped and framed by diverse property perspectives or schools of
thought described infra. Therefore, there is a range of answers
that coherently respond to each question.10 This fact is most
easily seen in Question #1 (Is this a property interest?). Courts’
acceptance or rejection of a proposed extension of what counts as
a legally recognized “property” interest inherently relies on (more
or less clear) normative visions of property law and can vary widely.
Answers to this question operate as an important gatekeeper.11
Questions frame and drive inquiry, particularly legal
inquiry.12 Once western tradition recognized “property” as a legal
category—not a mere social norm—and, in particular, a legal
category distinct from tort or contract law, certain questions
evolved which must be decided by courts.13 The questions express
property’s traditional core legal doctrinal issues. They will seem
familiar to property law professors because we have been using
and teaching these questions without necessarily articulating all
of them at the same time in a list. The primary contributions of
this essay are to call the questions out in their entirety,
articulate how they correlate to casebooks’ organization of topics,
and demonstrate the usefulness of using the framework of
questions in teaching. Finally, the framework advances the goal
of contemporary legal education to help students integrate legal

10 What has been called the “canon” of Progressive Property scholars incorporates
judicial answers to the traditional questions in ways that shape doctrine and favor
particular normative property views. See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and
Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CAL. L. REV. 107, 114 (2013)
(expressing some skepticism about the “creative use of outlier cases” such as State v. Shack
and Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association). Whether these cases are “outliers” or
a part of the core of property law is a normative question well worth pursing in the classroom.
11 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990)
(considering whether a person can have a sufficient legal interest in his own bodily tissues
amounting to personal property).
12 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF
PERSUADING JUDGES 83 (2008) (stating the question presented “may well be the most
important part of your brief”). See generally BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, S.J., INSIGHT: A
STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1978) (presenting an epistemology founded on
humans’ capacity for questioning).
13 See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, From Social Recognition of Property to Political
Recognition by the State: Peter Gerhart’s Property Law and Social Morality and the
Evolution of Positive Rights, 2 TEX. A&M J. REAL PROP. L. 287, 288 (2015) (reviewing book
that offers an evolutionary account of how legal property rights emerged from “social
recognitions” among potential claimants).
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analysis and legal practice14 because starting with the
questions—rather than the answers—is how lawyers actually
operate to serve their clients.
This essay’s argument is subtle and could be easily
misconstrued. It is not proposing a Grand Theory of Property, nor
is it taking a position on whether such a theory should be
pursued. It neither seeks to resolve any of the many important
conceptual and normative debates about property law nor to
appear to resolve them. Rather, it presents the value of an
anchoring framework that can be superimposed upon property
law doctrine as it is currently structured to facilitate students’
learning in the context of profound pluralism and uncertainty in
the field. It offers the structure based upon (primarily)
descriptive claims regarding what questions courts regularly
address in the common law tradition of property.15 It does not
endorse these questions as normatively appropriate or complete.16
It merely contends that students will be better able to explore the
radical pluralism of property law if they have a stable framework
from which to start.
Professors can introduce students to the questions early in
the course and use the questions as reference points to help
students recognize the connectedness of the topics. Casebook
editors could articulate the questions and explain their
relationship to the course topics in a preliminary way in an
introduction section. If desired, they could refer to the questions
14 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 12–13 (Jossey-Bass 2007).

LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR

15 Since dissolution of the “is-ought” distinction and increasing sophistication
regarding epistemology, it is impossible to claim that any statement is “purely
descriptive” since some acts of interpretation are involved in every assertion. This essay’s
claim to be descriptive is limited to the identification of the legal questions that courts ask
and answer in cases that are identified as “Property Law” cases. See infra Part III B (The
Relationships Among the Questions Can Be Complex) where I explain that while parties
can disagree about which question is raised by the facts, the only questions that a court
will recognize as Property Law questions are the ones I have identified. The author would
appreciate any citations to Property Law cases in which a court appears to ask and
answer different or additional legal questions than those identified in this essay.
16 One might think that the claim that courts are always asking the same set of
questions in Property Law cases inherently (or implicitly) commits the courts (or this
essay’s author) to a particular theory of “Property” (in particular, a “thing” or an
“ownership” view). See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings
of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309,
316–17 (2006) (describing the “castle model” of property which focuses on the protections
of the rights of owners). The ownership view considers property questions solely from the
point of view of the owner, neglecting the perspectives of non-owners and the
consequences on non-owners of legal recognition of owners’ rights. Superficially, the
questions identified in this essay appear to validate this view because they seem to beg a
specific answer or type of answer. However, in practice, they do not because courts answer
the questions from varied policy perspectives as explained infra notes 29–32 and
accompanying text.
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within their coverage of a particular topic or case in order to
demonstrate that the courts are indeed asking a limited set of
legal questions despite the particular phrasing of a legal issue in
any particular case.
This essay proceeds in the following four steps: first, it
explicates the problem; second, it articulates the proposed
solution—the framework of questions; third, it demonstrates how
the framework of questions comprehensively maps onto property
law doctrine; and fourth, it explains why the framework is useful
and suggests how to use this framework in property law courses.
I. THE PROBLEM: WIDELY-RECOGNIZED CHALLENGES IN TEACHING
AND LEARNING PROPERTY LAW
The contents of property law emerged as a montage of ill-fitting
subjects, jarringly connected by arcane language and obfuscatory
rules. . . . The lack of topical relevance was only outweighed by its
apparent lack of unity. The result was cognitive dissonance—a
disjointed grouping of unrelated topics.17

This essay evolved from my own struggles to teach property
and to make sense of the cases and relationships among topics,
doctrines, rules, policies, and theories.18 I soon found that I was
not alone. Property professors acknowledge this problem
openly.19 Many practicing attorneys bemoan the apparent
incoherence of property law as a field and particular property law
doctrines (usually giving special mention to future interests, the
requirements for the creation of real covenants, and, of course,
the reviled Rule Against Perpetuities).20 Even the U.S. Supreme
Court has opined in this vein: “[T]he body of property law . . . more
than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by

17 Friedland, supra note 6, at 581 (describing his experience of his property class in
law school).
18 I began teaching Property Law in the fall of 2002.
19 Menell & Dwyer, supra note 6, at 599 (“The property course has become a bundle
of topics that professors can liberally mix and match . . . but students suffer when their
property course lacks a cohesive framework upon which they can layer other concepts and
subjects in advanced courses. Few students . . . are able to retain much from a course that
comes across as disconnected bodies of doctrine whose only common element may be that they
involve land . . . . Property has devolved into a disparate set of doctrinal areas . . . . Each
Property professor has his or her potpourri of coverage, and most modern property [case]
books largely reflect and cater to that eclecticism.”); see also Michael Weir, Ways to Make
the Teaching of Property/Land Law More Interesting, 11 J. S. PAC. L. 107, 107 (2007)
(another property professor who writes: “For many students the study of property law can
be problematic. That means it is sometimes a problem for the lecturer. Property lawyers
revel in the medieval; the arcane, the convoluted but fundamental concepts that abound
in property law.”).
20 See generally Peter A. Appel, The Embarrassing Rule Against Perpetuities, 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 264 (2004).
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distinctions whose validity is largely historical.”21 And, so, it is no
surprise that bright and hardworking students often have more
difficulty synthesizing their Property Law course than other first
year foundational courses.22
Teaching Property Law presents at least two distinct
challenges: (1) lack of coherence at the doctrinal level: there are
disparate rules and doctrines across many distinct topics that
engender the perception among students that neither the topics
nor the doctrines “fit together”;23 and (2) lack of unity/coherence
at the policy and theory level: diverse policy and theory
perspectives for addressing property questions that are not
resolved and may be irresolvable.
Regarding the perceived lack of coherence at the doctrinal
level, most casebooks structure the course according to the
traditional topics.24 All casebooks give students a sense of the
Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960).
JAY M. FEINMAN, LAW 101: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 205 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (“Property law may be the basic
subject that most irritates law students. The fundamental principle of property law seems
obvious: If you own something it’s yours, and you can do what you want with it. But more
than any other subject, property law is burdened with a thousand years of legal history
and a plethora of technical distinctions.”). “Students have lamented the truth that
property, as traditionally taught, has been merely a sectional presentation of interests
relating to land, the relevance and the interconnectedness of which was never clarified,
much less emphasized. In short, property was accessible to only a few who ‘got it.’ The
remainder, and majority of students, surrendered to the view that property was a
monumental memorization task.” Comments on draft of this essay, Richard T. Sakai,
Assistant Professor, Co-Director, Academic Support Program, University of San
Francisco, School of Law (copy on file with author). And, it is possible that this problem
helps account for why so few law students publish notes about Property law. See Steve
Clowney, Property, Student Notes, and Elite Law Schools, PROPERTYPROF BLOG (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2011/02/property-student-notes-and-elite-lawschools.html (citing Andrew Yaphe, Taking Note of Notes: Student Legal Scholarship in
Theory and Practice, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 259, 282 (2012) (finding student Notes dedicated
to property account for only 7% of the total at non-elite schools and only 2% at elite
schools)) [http://perma.cc/2CUP-A5MT].
23 This perception is particularly likely when students compare Property doctrine
with Contracts and Torts, the other common law foundational courses. For example, while
the ins and outs of negligent torts may baffle some students, they can all easily grasp the
primary elements that structure legal analysis of all negligent torts: duty, breach,
causation, and damages. This essay provides a similar structure for the whole range of
Property Law issues in the form of a framework of questions.
24 In researching this essay, the author reviewed the following twenty-one Property
Law casebooks: JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL
H. SCHILL, PROPERTY, (7th ed. 2010); RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY, (3d ed. 2010); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW RULES,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, (5th ed. 2010); EDWARD E. CHASE & JULIA PATTERSON
FORRESTER, PROPERTY LAW CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS (2d ed. 2010); DAVID
CRUMP, DAVID S. CAUDILL & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, PROPERTY: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND
LAWYERING STRATEGIES, (2d ed. 2008); BARLOW BURKE, ANN M. BURKHART & R.H.
HELMHOLZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW, (3d ed. 2010); ROGER BERNHARDT, JOYCE
PALOMAR & PATRICK RANDOLPH JR., PROPERTY CASES AND STUDIES (2d ed. 2009); THOMAS
W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2d ed. 2012);
21
22
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profound pluralism of Property Law, along with a few limited
navigation tools.25 Casebook editors have struggled valiantly and
attempted creative solutions to offer a coherent framework to
understand the rules and the roles that courts play across the
various topics and doctrines.26 But their efforts may still leave
students swimming in a sea of apparently unrelated rules which
are grouped around a dozen distinct topics.27 The framework of
questions reduces the swirling mass of information and issues on
at least one dimension. The framework of questions does not
“solve” this problem by oversimplifying a complex world, but
rather by providing analytical clarity that makes managing the
uncertainty easier.
Regarding the perceived lack of unity/coherence at the policy
and theory level, there is no currently dominant “theory” of
Property Law. Rather, from an intellectual and academic
standpoint, at least since Thomas Grey’s famous chapter
announcing the “disintegration” of Property,28 scholars have
struggled to make sense out of the institution of private property

GRANT S. NELSON, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, CONTEMPORARY
PROPERTY (3d ed. 2008); JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY, A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2009); R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, JEROME M. ORGAN & ALICE
M. NOBLE-ALLGIRE, PROPERTY AND LAWYERING (3d ed. 2011); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S.
MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
(2001); JAMES CHARLES SMITH, EDWARD J. LARSON, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & JOHN A.
KIDWELL, PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008); CALVIN MASSEY, PROPERTY
LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND CASES (2012); SHELDON F. KURTZ, HERBERT
HOVENKAMP & CAROL NECOLE BROWN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY
LAW (6th ed. 2012); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY C. KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW:
POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON GOOD (2012); DAVID L. CALLIES, J. GORDON
HYLTON, JOHN MARTINEZ & DANIEL R. MANDELKER, CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY LAW (2011) (this casebook replaces J. GORDON HYLTON, DAVID L. CALLIES,
DANIEL R. MANDELKER & PAULA A. FRANZESE, PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2007)); EDWARD RABIN, ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL,
JEFFREY KWALL & CRAIG ANTHONY ARNOLD, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW
(6th ed. 2011); JON BRUCE & JAMES ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN
PROPERTY LAW (6th ed. 2007); JOHN E. CRIBBET, ROGER W. FINDLEY, ERNEST E. SMITH &
JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 2008); D. BENJAMIN
BARROS & ANNA P. HEMINGWAY, PROPERTY LAW (2105). For lists of which casebooks
organize property doctrine in the traditional way and which do not, see infra note 103.
25 Many casebooks use some of the questions, e.g., Questions #3 and #4, to organize
some topics and doctrines.
26 See, e.g., DWYER & MENELL, supra note 24 (this casebook “conceptualizes the
course through the comparative analysis of the major institutions—legal, social, market,
and political—governing resources”); Peter S. Menell & John P. Dwyer, Reunifying
Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 599, 601–02 (2002) (introducing the casebook).
27 Note: I am not suggesting that casebooks should organize the course according to
these questions instead of by topics. See Section IV of this essay for my suggestions on
how to use this framework.
28 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69, 69 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (“By contrast, the theory of property rights held
by the modern specialist tends both to dissolve the notion of ownership and to eliminate
any necessary connection between property rights and things.”).
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and understand courts’ roles in it. The scholarly literature is rife
with descriptive, conceptual, and normative conflicts.29 One treatise
lists the following leading schools of thought: “Justice, Liberty,
or Rights-Based Approaches; Utilitarian or Consequentialist
Approaches; Social Relations Approaches; Libertarian and
Progressive Approaches.”30 More recently, a Virtue Ethics
approach to Property Law has joined the conversation.31 Others
have distinguished between essentialist schools and positivists.32
Even the ubiquitous “bundle of sticks” metaphor is disputed and
understood in numerous ways.33

29 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009) (property decisions involve “plural values” and “cannot
be adequately understood or analyzed through a single metric”); Steven J. Eagle, The
Really New Property: A Skeptical Appraisal, 43 IND. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (2010); J.E.
Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 723–24 (1996)
(“‘[P]roperty is a bundle of rights’ asserts the claim that property is a concept without a
definable ‘essence’; different combinations of the bundle in different circumstances may
all count as ‘property’ and no particular right or set of rights in the bundle is
determinative.”); HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011); Eric R.
Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 617,
617–18 (2009) (reviewing Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, eds. PROPERTY:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2007)); Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of
Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 917 (2012) (proposing “property as a machine” and
“property as a conversation” as illuminating metaphors); Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 531 (2005); Craig Anthony
(Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property As A Web of Interests, 26 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 281–84 (2002); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces
Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 372 (2003); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-OStix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239, 239
(1994); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L
REV. 561, 569 (1983) (“As the property concept was generalized and decorporealized, it
faded into the generic concept of right, which in turn proved to be systematically
ambiguous (e.g., Hohfeld) if not entirely indeterminate.”).
30 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY (3d ed. 2010); see SUSAN BRIGHT & SARAH
BLANDY, SURVEY OF PROPERTY LAW ACADEMICS RELATING TO RESEARCH APPROACHES
2013: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS (2013), https://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.302966!/file/PRSurvey-Report.pdf (reporting areas of research in the following categories: Property
Doctrine/Black Letter for academic audience, Property Doctrine/Black Letter for
practitioner audience, Property Theory, Socio-legal, Comparative property law, Empirical,
Critical Legal Studies, and noting other approaches such as legal history, law and
geography, law and development, and critical race studies) [http://perma.cc/PSM7-8FGH].
This study included academics who consider themselves working in the field of property
law from the United States and England.
31 See, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 864–74 (2009).
32 See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY C. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 15–16 (2007); Tony Honore, Ownership, in MAKING LAW BIND, 161, 165–76
(1987) (identifying eleven elements of “full ownership”). See generally Hanoch Dagan,
Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law (Tel Aviv Univ. Legal Working Paper Series,
Tel Aviv Univ. Law Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 128, 2011) http://law.bepress.com/
taulwps/art128/.
33 See Symposium, Property: A Bundle of Rights?, ECON JOURNAL WATCH, Vol. 8, No. 3,
(Sept. 2011), http://econjwatch.org/issues/volume-8-issue-3-september-2011 [http://perma.cc/
9L37-ZLVS].
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While many scholars have proposed solutions to “unify
Property” based upon one or another substantive view, none have
attracted consensual support or agreement.34 Recent studies of
Property courses document how professors mix and match
doctrinal topics to fit the number of units available; these studies
are further evidence of the lack of unity in Property Law.35 A
professor’s personal interests and preferences or what topics are
tested on a state’s bar exam appear as likely to determine topic
selection as any general theory.
There is very little Property Law literature or commentary
that directly or comprehensively addresses these teaching
challenges.36 This essay offers a solution to the first challenge.
And, while it does not “solve” the second challenge, it offers
useful assistance in meeting it.
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF QUESTIONS
The following questions constitute a framework that
provides analytical clarity and “grips” to help students cope with
the multiplicity and apparent disunity of common law doctrines
of Property generally taught in law schools.37
34 At present, property law is not a unified field. Whether it ever was, ever could be,
or should be are the focus of a large amount of property law scholarship. See, e.g.,
publications listed supra notes 28–32; see also Laura S. Underkuffler, Book Review,
Stuart Banner, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN
(2011), 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504, 507–08 (2012) (arguing that property has no “true nature”;
“[i]f by property’s ‘true nature,’ we mean that there is an enduring idea of content or
configuration of rights that property represents, then property largely (if not completely)
fails this test”). This essay addresses a different issue: how to teach property law doctrine
in the context of such radical pluralism. In the author’s personal view, property law will
never be “unified” in the sense that one theory will encompass all doctrines and rules in a
manner that receives consensus. This is because the concept of “property” and its
multifaceted and complex roles in our individual and social lives can never be adequately
reduced to one meaning. “Property” is an essentially contested concept. Each of the
approaches noted above will have something distinct, relevant, and justifiable to say
about property law questions, including how they are unnecessarily limiting and biasing.
This pluralism makes the subject endlessly fascinating, but it also makes it harder for
students to learn.
35 See supra note 7.
36 For some exceptions, see publications cited supra note 6.
37 This essay focuses on common law property rules and doctrines because they are
the core of most property law courses. The framework also applies to statutory property
rules and doctrines and constitutional property law. The framework applies to property
doctrines created by legislation because these laws address the same legal questions as
the common law. If we ask how any particular regulation of property aims to achieve the
regulation’s purpose, we are directed to one or more of the questions. For example, the
Recording Acts address Question #4 (ownership) by deciding which title is superior. The
federal Fair Housing Act aims to enforce an anti-discrimination principle by primarily
addressing Question #5 (property rights entailed by ownership). Constitutional property
issues, e.g., concerning whether governmental regulation of property is constitutionally
valid as an exercise of either the police power or the power of eminent domain are, of
course, distinct. They can be understood as covered by Questions #1 (is it a property
interest for constitutional purposes), Question #5 (what are the property rights entailed
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1. Is There a “Property Interest” at Issue?38
First, the threshold question: Is the thing (or relationship) of
value at issue a legally recognized and protected “property”
interest, some other kind of legal right (e.g., a personal right), or
merely an expectancy interest?39 Any answer a court provides in
such a dispute presumes some at least implied notion of what is
“property.” This well-recognized question40 reflects an ongoing
tension within Property Law regarding continuity and change;
and the history of Property Law evinces substantial adjustments
to the definition of private property.
More fundamentally, this question asks: What should be
propertized? Historically, an obvious example is the horrific
institution of chattel slavery in which U.S. courts treated some
Africans as a recognized type of “property” from the nation’s
founding until the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.41 Another historical example is servitudes. Conflicts
regarding courts’ recognition of these interests as property
interests versus contractual rights extended over a long period.42
More recently, Goldberg v. Kelly and related cases conceptualized
government benefits as a species of property.43 Developing technology
often raises this issue. Contemporary examples include Moore
v. Regents of the University of California.44 And while planets and
by ownership), and Question #8 (how are property rights enforced), but it is important to
recognize them as constitutional issues not matters of common law property. The degree
to which the framework’s questions would assist the teaching of the bulk of the
intellectual property material (patent, copyright, and trademark) is beyond the scope of
this essay. Clearly, many of the same questions seem initially applicable. However,
intellectual property law includes a much more substantive notion of “public domain” as
an implied limit on the scope of intellectual property rights. And the tests for
infringement of intellectual property rights (e.g., “fair use”) are phrased and operate very
differently from other types of property.
38 This essay focuses mostly on privately-owned property.
39 When someone is named as a devisee in a will of a living person, she has only an
expectancy interest and has no standing to sue if the person wants to change the terms of
the will. See also Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264,
1280 (6th Cir. 1980) (rejecting claims that steel workers possessed a property interest in
the plants where they had worked).
40 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 30, at 185–278; Sealing, supra note 7, at 59; Laura S.
Underkuffler, Book Review, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504, 504 (2012) (reviewing STUART
BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN (2011))
(identifying the question “What is property?” as a primary theme in the book).
41 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 193 (1836) (distinguishing
Massachusetts laws, which did not consider a child a slave, from Louisiana laws).
42 See discussion of this historical development in DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER
& SCHILL, supra note 24, at 847–59.
43 See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Charles Reich, The Liberty
Impact of the New Property, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295 (1980). See also Charles A. Reich,
The New Property After 25 Years, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 223 (1990). But see Charland v. Norge
Division, Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1969) (finding no legally recognizable
property right in a job).
44 See generally Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (1990).
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asteroids are not currently subject to ownership claims by states
pursuant to international treaties, evolving technology may revise
this position.45 Environmental conditions may also raise this issue.46
Animal rights cases pose this question in a complex way because
the proponents are split on the issue of whether or not propertizing
animals will best serve advocates’ goals.47 This issue is critical to a
regulatory takings claim because a plaintiff must demonstrate that
she owns a recognized property interest in order to bring her claim.48
For some things of value, the question is answered absolutely
(e.g., a vote is never a property interest), while for others the
answer is qualified by purposes and context. Courts sometimes
employ a concept of “quasi-property” in situations where something
exhibits only limited indicia of property or is considered property
only for a limited purpose.49 The human body presents an
interesting example. In the United States, organs are not
“property,” but many body products, such as hair, blood, semen,
and ova are treated as property.50 And some courts recognize

45 See, e.g., Kenneth Chang, A Business Plan for Space, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/10/science/a-business-plan-for-space.html.
46 See, e.g., Shelley Ross Saxer, Managing Water Rights Using Fishing Rights As a
Model, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 91, 93 (2011) (arguing that water rights ought not to be
considered as property rights).
47 See generally collection of articles in 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. (2010).
48 A claim under the Fifth Amendment takings clause requires a court to consider a
two-part test. First, the court must determine whether there is a “cognizable Fifth
Amendment property interest” that is the subject of the purported taking and, second,
whether there was an actual taking. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. U.S., 669 F.3d
1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Compare id. at 1333 (holding an opportunity to operate a
mitigation bank is not a property interest under the Takings Clause), with Cty. of San
Diego v. Miller, 532 P.2d 139, 143 (Cal. 1975) (applying a “fairness and public policy” test
to find that an unexercised option to purchase land is a property interest for purposes of
eminent domain, even though it is not an estate under traditional common law concepts of
property). See also Maureen E. Brady, Property’s Ceiling: State Courts and the Expansion of
Takings Clause Property (Va. L. Rev., Working Paper, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2673783
(documenting judicial restrictions on regulatory takings by determining what constitutes
“property” and state courts’ expansion of the definition of private property).
49 See, e.g., Leno v. St. Joseph Hospital, 302 N.E.3d 58, 59–60 (Ill. 1973) (“The
principle is firmly established that while in the ordinary sense, there is no property right
in a dead body, a right of possession of a decedent’s remains devolves upon the next of kin
in order to make appropriate disposition thereof, whether by burial or otherwise.”). Courts
must also determine if something is property for the purposes of a particular law, e.g.,
Cal. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 247 P.3d 112, 117 (Cal. 2011)
(addressing whether a water right is a “property right” for purposes of Proposition 218
regarding the two-thirds voting requirement for a tax).
50 See, e.g., Lisa Milot, What Are We—Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts?: The Tax
Treatment of Transfers of Human Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1086,
1092, 1104 (2010); Brian Morris, You’ve Got to Be Kidneying Me!: The Fatal Problem of
Severing Rights and Remedies from the Body of Organ Donation Law, 74 BROOK. L. REV.
543, 553 (2009); Erin Colleran, Comment, My Body, His Property?: Prescribing A
Framework to Determine Ownership Interests in Directly Donated Human Organs, 80
TEMP. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2007); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d
479 (Cal. 1990).
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educational degrees as property in the context of divorce, but not
for other purposes.51
2. If It Is Property, What Type of Property Interest Is It?52
Courts distinguish between different types of property interests,
e.g., real and personal property, tangible and intangible property,
and public and private property. Courts identify which particular
“property interest” has been created by a document, an agreement
between individuals, or some other human action.
Scholarship documenting the Doctrine of Numerus Clausus
suggests that courts persist in recognizing a limited number of
specific types of property interests. If a court has answered
Question #1 affirmatively, it must fit the claim into one of several
pre-existing categories.53 This is part of what we teach in the
classification of estates and future interests section of the course.
Courts are regularly asked to decide what property interests are
created by a grantor’s ambiguous language, e.g., a fee simple
determinable or a fee simple subject to condition subsequent?54
When state legislatures abolished the fee tail estate, they directed
courts to reinterpret what property interest was created by a document
purporting to create a fee tail. When California abolished the possibility
of reverter, it directed courts to treat interests that would have
been so classified as right of entry/power of termination. Courts
decide whether a document referring to itself as a “lease” actually
creates a “leasehold estate” or some other kind of property interest
(e.g., a license, an easement, or a profit).55
Defining a particular property interest will also often define, in
turn, a particular “property relationship” between the parties. In our
property law tradition, there is not one singular owner—non-owner
relationship, but rather a myriad of distinct property relationships,
e.g., bailor-bailee, donor-donee, grantor-grantee, concurrent interest
51 Compare O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716 (N.Y. 1985) (interpreting state
statute to include an interest in a profession or professional career to be a marital
property asset divisible at divorce), with In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo.
1978) (holding that an MBA degree was not subject to division). See In re Marriage of
Spengler, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 764, 771–72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a right to renew a
term life insurance policy could be a property interest divisible at divorce for purposes of
California’s Community Property law); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A
Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 612 n.418 (2005).
52 Note: This question is often answered in conjunction with Question #3 (how is that
type of property interest created or initially acquired?), but it is conceptually distinct.
53 For a proposal to reform our estates and future interests, see D. Benjamin Barros,
Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6 (2009).
54 See, e.g., Mahrenholz v. Cty. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 544 N.E.2d 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
55 See, e.g., Cook v. Univ. Plaza, 427 N.E.2d 405, 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding
“Residence Hall Contract Agreement” regulating use of university dorms was not a lease).
Landlord-tenant relationships are particularly complex because they involve an
unresolved mix of property law, contract law, and tort law.

Do Not Delete

334

6/20/17 7:22 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 20:2

holders, mortgagor-mortgagee, present interest holders-future interest
holders, and dominant estate owner-servient estate owner. What
specific property rights are entailed by ownership of a particular
type of property and a particular property relationship is a distinct
question (Question #5, infra.) Sometimes the property relationship
is tightly linked to the answers to Question #5 (e.g., in most states
defining a leasehold interest specifies certain rights and duties
between the landlord and the tenant); other times, it is not, functioning
only as a label without much pre-set content (e.g., the content of
a real covenant will be defined by the text of the covenant).
3. How Is That Type of Property Interest Created or Initially
Acquired?56
This question is often explicitly covered in casebooks. There are
numerous ways that property interests can be created or initially
acquired. Property interests are generally created by deliberate
human action and agreements, and expressed in documents. But some
property interests, e.g., a successful adverse possessor’s estate,57
certain easements,58 and an implied equitable servitude,59 can be
created by operation of law.
Disputes about creation or initial acquisition of property
interests include the test for what constitutes “occupation” of a
wild animal and the issue of whether a deed can create an
easement in a third party?60 Once property is initially owned,
subsequent ownership is determined by answers to Questions #4–8.
4. Who “Owns” the Property Interest? How Are Competing
Ownership Claims Decided?
Some Property Law casebooks articulate this question
explicitly and use it to organize part of the course.61 Under the
rubric of these questions, we teach doctrines such as the Rule of
Capture, the Law of Finding, and Adverse Possession and
56 This question is distinct from the fundamental property theory issue of how can a
private property system be normatively justified which is often an issue raised early in
Property Law courses. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Three Reasons Why Even Good Property
Rights Cause Moral Anxiety, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1927, 1927 (2007). American courts
assume a private property system and ask this question within that system.
57 See, e.g., Mullis v. Winchester, 118 S.E.2d 61 (S.C. 1961) (adverse possession). The
title acquired by adverse possession is understood to be a new title, not a transfer of a
property interest from the previous owner.
58 See, e.g., Strollo v. Iannantuoni, 734 A.2d 144 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (implied
easement by necessity); Bubis v. Kassin, 733 A.2d 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
(implied easement by prior existing use); Melendez v. Hintz, 724 P.2d 137 (Idaho 1986)
(prescriptive easement); Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1976) (easement by estoppel).
59 See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925) (implied equitable servitude).
60 At old common law, the answer was an unequivocal “no.” But see generally Willard
v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972).
61 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 30, at 97–183.
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relativity of title.62 The common law did not presume a single
owner, but included numerous multi-owner forms, such as
concurrent interests.
The rules are informed by purpose and context. The
elements and rules for adverse possession of an entire lot differ
from those pertaining to border disputes,63 and differ again as
between a claimant with a defective deed and one without any
document purporting to ground an ownership claim.64
5. What “Property Rights” Does Ownership in This Property
Entail, and with What Limits/Scope and Duties?
While neither courts nor commentators regularly employ
Wesley Hohfeld’s categories and terminology,65 courts do
regularly analyze an ownership interest to identify specific rights
it includes.66 This may be the most contested area.67
Ownership of many types of property entails a familiar group
of rights (viz. the right to possess/use/control, the right to
exclude, and the right to transfer),68 but a wide variety of other
familiar property interests do not.69 An owner of stocks (an
intangible property interest) has obvious rights to control,

62 Id. at 797–98 (capture); id. at 800–01 (finding and relativity of title); id. at 140–43
(adverse possession); id. at 541 (recording acts often reverse the result of a common law
analysis of priority of title).
63 Compare Manillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 262 (N.J. 1969) (articulating and
revising elements for adverse possession in a boundary dispute), with Mullis v.
Winchester, 118 S.E.2d 61, 63 (S.C. 1961) (articulating elements for adverse possession of
a parcel).
64 Compare Norman v. Allison, 775 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1989) (claim of title), with
Mullis, 118 S.E.2d at 66 (color of title).
65 A comprehensive formal analysis of jural relations (opposites and correlatives)
was articulated in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–33 (1913).
66 See, e.g., U.S. v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (“A common idiom describes
property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in certain
combinations, constitute property.”); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582
(1936) (“The privilege of use is only one attribute, among many, of the bundle of privileges
that make up property or ownership. A state is at liberty, if it pleases, to tax them all
collectively, or to separate the faggots [sticks] and lay the charge distributively.”). Professor
Merrill articulates this distinction as between a “discrete asset” (legally recognized
property form) and an “incident of property” (power or privilege that belongs to someone
who owns the property, but is not a legally recognized form of property itself). Thomas W.
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 974 (2000).
67 Commenting on an earlier version of this draft, Professor Peggy Radin remarked
that Question #5 is “the big kahuna.” (Email on file with author).
68 Examples include ownership of a paperback book or a car. Others have
investigated additional “property rights.” See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to
Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 355 (2010); Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 191 (2010).
69 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509–10 (1990) (Mosk,
J., dissenting) (discussing the typical bundle of rights and exceptions to it).
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exclude, and transfer, but she has no meaningful “right to
possess.”70 Water rights are usually considered to be merely
usufruct rights, i.e. rights of use.71
Property interests with traditionally clear rights may be
subject to reexamination in a new context. Usually a spouse
owning property held in the tenancy by the entirety form does
not have a unilateral right to transfer.72 But in U.S. v. Craft, the
U.S. Supreme Court considered “whether a tenant by the entirety
possesses ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ to which a federal tax
lien may attach.”73 And, the meaning and scope of the Public Trust
doctrine, through which a state reserves certain property rights
to the state and its people, has recently been broadly explored.74
Practically speaking, because we live in an interdependent
world, all property rights cannot be absolute.75 Having a specific
right (e.g., the right to exclude) is different from knowing the
“scope” or limits of that right. The plaintiffs in right to exclude
cases may frame their cases in absolutist terms—as if the issue
was having a right to exclude or not—but often courts resolve
such disputes by declaring the scope of a recognized right by a
recognized owner.76

70 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 369 (Aspen Law &
Business, 2001) (“The traditional view of the corporation is that it is owned by the
shareholders.”). WILLIAM ALLEN ET AL., CASES AND COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 58 (3d ed. 2008) (“Thus, a functional two-level ownership
structure characterizes partnerships and all business entities: The contributors of equity
capital do not ‘own’ the assets themselves but rather own the rights to the net financial
returns that these assets generate, as well as certain governance or management rights.”).
71 See, e.g., Shelley Ross Saxer, Managing Water Rights Using Fishing Rights As a
Model, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 91, 92 n.5 (2011) (citing authorities). Singer’s explication of three
common law rules on surface water (“natural flow,” “common enemy,” and “reasonable
use”) demonstrate the range of limited scope of rights and correlative duties the
neighboring landowners can enjoy. SINGER, supra note 70, at 121–23.
72 See, e.g., Long v. Earle, 269 N.W. 577, 581 (1936) (“It is well-settled under the law
of this State that one tenant by the entirety has no interest separable from that of the other.”).
73 U.S. v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 276 (2002). The Court’s phrasing of the issue could be
interpreted as asking Question #1 (is this “property”) or Question #5 (what rights are
entailed in ownership). This opinion partly depended upon the justices’ interpretation of
the relationship between federal law and state law. State courts’ interpretation of their
state’s version of the Married Women’s Separate Property Act resulted in a variety of
possible understandings of the tenancy by the entirety.
74 See, e.g., Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4
WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 281, 283 (2014).
75 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 329 (1981).
76 See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W. 2d. 154, 159 (Wis. 1997)
(construing the right to exclude with a broad scope); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372
(N.J. 1971) (construing the right to exclude more narrowly); Campbell v. Westdahl, 715
P.2d 288, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (considering the scope of a tenant’s right to transfer
her leasehold estate, this court opines: “The modern trend is to impose a standard of
reasonableness on the landlord in withholding consent to a sublease unless the lease
expressly states otherwise.”).
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Property Law recognizes limits on the property rights of
property owners vis-à-vis non-owners as well as vis-à-vis
other property owners.77 Generally, there are three sources of
limits: the common law, grantors, and government regulation.
Nuisance law is the paramount example of common law limits
between property owners. The legal rules of nuisance are
explicitly (and notoriously) contextual. Courts also identify
property owners’ duties, e.g., the duty to not commit waste78 and
landowners’ duties to those who enter their property.79
In practice, the answers to the question, what “property
rights” does ownership in this property entail, and with what
limits/scope and duties?, are determined by courts’ answers to
four interrelated sub-questions: (a) What specific rights are
recognized in this property in this context?;80 (b) How are these
rights related to each other?;81 (c) What is the “scope” (limits) of

77 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. State Bd of Equal., 386 P.2d. 496, 550 (Cal. 1963)
(“Ownership is not a single concrete entity but a bundle of rights and privileges as well as
of obligations.”). See generally Eduardo M. Penalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109
MICH. L. REV. 191 (2010) (uncovering the common law limits on the right to abandon
property). KURTZ, HOVENKAMP & BROWN, supra note 24, at 178–95, includes a subsection
on the obligations associated with bailment. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 24, at 361–499,
includes a chapter entitled “Owner Sovereignty and Its Limits,” discussing exceptions to
(or limitations on) the right to exclude.
78 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER & SCHILL, supra note 24, at 217–18
(discussion of duty to avoid waste).
79 Traditionally, landowners owed different duties to different classes of non-owners
depending upon the status of the entrant as trespasser, licensee, or invitee. Carter v. Kinney,
896 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Mo. 1995). In the modern time, many courts have combined these into a
single “reasonableness” duty. See Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 52 (Neb. 1996).
80 In the concurrent ownership interests context, this question asks: what are the
relative rights of the co-owners of the same property?
81 For example, concurrent interests present formidable challenges to courts in this
sub-question. To illustrate, the inherent ambiguity (or arguable incoherence) of the
relationship between cotenants’ equal rights to use a concurrent interest estate has
challenged courts, leading to different jurisdictional default rules (out of possession
cotenant’s right to rent from cotenant in possession). More generally, current variant
answers to this question include: (1) a near-infinitely variable “bundle of rights” (J.E.
Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712–13 (1996)
(describing the “bundle of rights” as the “currently prevailing understanding of property
in what might be called mainstream Anglo-American legal philosophy” and attributing
this view to Lawrence C. Becker, Stephen R. Munzer, and Jeremy Waldron); see also
JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (1st
ed. 1888) (“The dullest individual among the people knows and understands that his
property in anything is a bundle of rights.”)); (2) a fundamental/basic right of exclusive
possession upon which other rights are derived (Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the
Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (“[T]he right to exclude others is more
than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property--it is the sine qua non.”)); (3)
a web of interests (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property
As A Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 281–84 (2002)); and (4) the bucket of
water metaphor—that all the rights are thoroughly interconnected and interdependent
(Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1441–43 (2007) (citing
Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1760 (2004)
(quoting WILLIAM MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 158 (6th ed. 1905) (asserting that
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each property right?; and (d) What affirmative obligations (or
duties) come with ownership?82
Not every case requires consideration of all of these sub-issues.
Unfortunately, when cases do present these sub-issues, courts
have neither been self-conscious, consistent, nor transparent
about how they reach and answer these sub-issues. Courts
neither necessarily answer all of these questions directly, nor in
any particular order. And sometimes, courts do not address these
sub-issues at all, but merely announce a holding.83
6. What Is Required to Make a Valid Transfer of This
Property Interest?
Property Law provides numerous rules defining what is required
to make a valid transfer.84 Property Law is conventionally distinguished
from contract law by the fact that no consideration is required for a
valid transfer of a property interest. The rules differ for real property,
personal property, and some intangible property.85 Rules concerning
valid transfer by gift86 or by deed87 fit under this question.88 The
Principle of Derivative Title (one cannot transfer greater rights than

ownership “is no more conceived as an aggregate of distinct rights than a bucket of water
is conceived as an aggregate of separate drops”))).
82 Examples of affirmative obligations include the duties of an owner of a present
interest to the owner(s) of a future interest, e.g., duty to not commit “waste.” For one view
on affirmative duties, see Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 499 (July 10, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2464545
(last visited Jan. 15, 2016) [http://perma.cc/WY3E-L8VF].
83 See, e.g., J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV.
711, 715 (1996) (criticizing the “bundle of rights” metaphor and using cases to
demonstrate “the absence of a concern [by some courts] to elaborate the legal concept of
property in more than a superficial way” and to “indicate how a court may avoid facing
difficult questions about the nature of property, in order to move quickly to consider
broader policy issues concerning the legal treatment of things of value”). Cf. U.S. v. Craft,
535 U.S. 274 (2002) (offering an unsatisfying explanation why state law understandings
of the rights entailed in a tenancy by the entirety are not respected by the federal
government) with Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306 (1984)
(explicating carefully the relative rights of the owner and the public under the public
trust doctrine).
84 See, e.g., NELSON, STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 230–44.
85 Students are often surprised that a transfer of a real property interest does not
have to be recorded in the public records in order to be a valid transfer.
86 See, e.g., Westleigh v. Conger, 755 A.2d 518, 519 (Me. 2000) (requiring present
donative intent, delivery, and acceptance).
87 Transfers of real property generally require execution of a valid deed, delivery of
the deed, and acceptance.
88 Rules for transfer by devise and intestate transfer are provided by statute.
Importantly, neither adverse possession nor abandonment is a form of “transfer” of
property interests. Adverse possession primarily concerns Question #4 (who owns the
property interest) as is shown by the contexts in which the doctrine is raised. If an
erstwhile adverse possessor is successful, a new title is created by operation of law, not by
transfer. Abandonment doctrine addresses how a property interest can be terminated
(Question #7), and then become available for someone else to acquire (Question #3).
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she possesses) seems clear enough but has common law exceptions
derived from equitable estoppel.89
Given the contemporary dominance of doctrines favoring
alienability, most types of property are transferrable. Whether
some property interests should be “market inalienable” or not is
a well-established debate.90
It seems obvious that someone designated as “an owner” may
transfer an interest validly, but a woman who owns property
with her husband as a tenant by the entirety could not transfer it
alone. It seems equally obvious that only an owner may transfer
an interest validly, but the common law estate jure uxoris (which
gave a husband an estate in all of the land owned by his wife at
marriage) allowed the husband to sell land titled in his wife’s
name to a third party subject to certain limitations.
Most transfers of property interests are deliberate and
intentional. But sometimes they can occur by operation of law,
e.g., when title passes to the holder of a possibility of reverter
when the defeasing condition is violated.
7. How Long Does the Property Interest Last? How Can the
Property Interest Be Terminated?
Because property interests may or may not last indefinitely,
courts need rules to determine how long an interest lasts and
how an interest can be terminated. For example, if a grantor has
correctly created a fee simple determinable, then the violation of
the condition terminates the present interest and the holder of
the possibility of reverter now owns the property. A cotenant in
the common law joint tenancy can destroy the “right of
survivorship” with ease. In contrast, a cotenant in a tenancy by
the entireties cannot unilaterally do the same; the right of
survivorship in a tenancy by the entireties can only be
terminated by the spouses’ joint action or divorce.
When grantors do not provide expressly how or when a
property interest lasts, the modern presumption is that it lasts as
long as the interest conveyed can last. Courts have developed
various other rules to decide this question, from the doctrine of
See FREYERMUTH, ORGAN & NOBLE-ALLGIRE, supra note 24, at 146–48.
Most property interests can be bought and sold in the market; they are “market
alienable.” However, some property interests (e.g., one’s organs) are treated as “market
inalienable”—they may be transferrable as gifts but not for economic consideration. See
e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 931 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1849–50 (1987); Walter Block, Market-Inalienabilty Once Again: Reply to Radin, 22 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 37, 37 (1999); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1403, 1406 (2009).
89
90
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abandonment91 to the Doctrine of Changed Conditions.92 This
area is not free of dispute. The Pocanos case can be read as a
tragicomic story of how difficult it can be for an owner to abandon
a real property interest under the law.93
8. How Are Property Rights in This Kind of Property
Enforced?
Questions concerning enforcement of property rights are
both important and complex. The critical sub-questions are: Has
a property right been violated? Against whom can the owner(s)
enforce the property right? What defenses can be raised against
enforcement? And, what remedies are available if a violation
is proven?94
There are a wide variety of rules determining if a property
right has been violated and what defenses are available (e.g.,
whether any defense to unauthorized use is available). Liability
rules range from bright line rules, to various standards, to
elements tests and factor tests. Rules defining which party bears
the burden of proof can be outcome-determinative.95 Common law
jurisprudence is a primary source for these rules, but the terms
of an inter-vivos grant or a will may also determine how a
particular property right may be enforced.
Regarding the sub-question “against whom can the owner(s)
enforce the property right,” many property rights are “in
rem”—enforceable against all non-owners. However, some

91 Abandonment concerns how a true owner can terminate her ownership interest
unilaterally without transfer to another person or entity. It is therefore not an answer to
Question #6 because while it is a relinquishment (ending of a property ownership in
Question #7), it is not a transfer of this interest to another owner. The consequence of
successful abandonment raises Question #3—how the (possibly) valuable property can be
acquired by someone else, e.g., a finder.
92 For example, the Doctrine of Changed Conditions is applied in the context of
interests that run with the land, e.g., easements, real covenants, and equitable
servitudes. See, e.g., Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski, 495 P.2d 624 (Nev. 1972)
(recognizing the doctrine but refusing to apply it to a single-family subdivision). The
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 7.10(1) (2000) would apply the
doctrine of changed conditions to all “servitudes.” The Marketable Title acts provide a
statutory basis for terminating property interests. See FREYERMUTH, ORGAN & NOBLEALLGIRE, supra note 24, at 756–57.
93 See Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233 (Pa. 1995). In this
case, the owners of a tract of undeveloped real property in a common interest community
found out it was undevelopable, but were still required to continue to pay homeowner
association fees. They attempted to rid themselves of the property in numerous ways
unsuccessfully. Id.
94 For example, in Alby v. Banc One Financial, 128 P.3d 81, 83 (Wash. 2006), the
court must decide whether a condition included in the deed was enforceable, whether the
condition was violated, and, if so, what is the remedy.
95 See discussion of Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401 (1986) in Note 2 in
FREYERMUTH, ORGAN & NOBLE-ALLGIRE, supra note 24, at 548–49.
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commonly recognized property rights—cotenants in concurrent
interest, easements, and real covenants/equitable servitudes—only
bind some specified others with whom one is in a particular
property relationship.96
Regarding remedies, the famous Calabresi and Melamed
article distinguishing “property rules” from “liability rules”
addressed what remedies courts should make available to
wronged property owners from an economic perspective.97 Courts’
answers to these questions vary by the type of property and the
context.98 And, the answers have changed over time. At common
law, property was reflexively protected by “property rules,” but in
modern times, courts have brought a more flexible approach to
this issue, sometimes employing property rules and sometimes
liability rules to protect property rights. This flexibility is
demonstrated in some nuisance cases99 and in some minor
encroachment cases.100 There is also a modern trend to deny
property owners “self-help” remedies that were traditionally available
to them under common law to enforce their property rights.101

96 Cotenants in concurrent interests have certain rights and duties toward each
other. The Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P.2d 73, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) case formally
raises Question 8 (can a cotenant sue to cancel a lease in a joint tenancy which she has
not joined), but its answer exemplifies the difficulty courts have had in answering
Question #5 regarding the scope of rights created in concurrent interests. See also
DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER & SCHILL, supra note 24, at 847–51, 857 (discussing
legal requirements for enforceability of Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes).
97 Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1097 (1972). “An
entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to
remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller . . . . Whenever someone
may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value
for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.” Id. at 1092. Thus, if a property
interest is protected by a “property rule” and someone is found to interfere with it, a court
will typically issue injunctive relief to protect the owner’s interest, but if the property
interest is protected by a “liability rule” and someone is found to interfere with it, a court
will typically issue an award for money damages.
98 Id. at 1093 (“Taney's house may be protected by a property rule in situations
where Marshall wishes to purchase it, by a liability rule where the government decides to
take it by eminent domain . . . .”). In contrast, “[t]he bailee has an absolute duty to
redeliver the object of the bailment to the bailor.” DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER &
SCHILL, supra note 24, at 144; see Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special
Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1996) (arguing that while property is a special
right, the special characteristics of property “demand that property protection be give a
far more complex—and contingent—interpretation than other constitutionally protected rights”).
99 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970).
100 See, e.g., Mannillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378, 382, 389 (1969) (“[I]f the innocent
trespasser of a small portion of land adjoining a boundary line cannot without great
expense remove or eliminate the encroachment, or such removal or elimination is
impractical or could be accomplished only with great hardship, the true owner may be
forced to convey the land so occupied upon payment of the fair value thereof . . . .”).
101 See, e.g., Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 149–50 (Minn. 1978).
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III. MAPPING THE QUESTIONS ONTO THE PROPERTY COURSE
A.

The Framework of Questions Encompasses Property Law
The framework captures the material covered by the
Property Law course because there is a tight congruence between
the framework of questions and the doctrines and topics
presented in Property Law casebooks. Quite simply, these
questions are what courts in common law Property cases ask and
then answer in their opinions.102 This section maps the questions
onto the traditional topics and cases.
Most casebooks are organized according to a traditional
ordering of topics and doctrines.103 The cases included in this
traditional array of topics present, albeit implicitly, all of the
questions. This brief overview will demonstrate the congruence

102 I derived these questions from my own extensive study of the cases and teaching
experience. While conducting research for this essay, I found that this articulation of
questions also finds some support in in Property Law scholarship, including by authors
who do not share the same philosophical or theoretical perspectives on Property Law. See,
e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
531, 531 (2005). In this article, the authors present their theory of Property based upon
“the value inherent in stable ownership.” “This Article begins by demonstrating that any
coherent and comprehensive property theory must address four legal questions: (1) [w]hat
things are protected by property law; (2) vis-à-vis whom; (3) with what rights; and (4) by
what enforcement mechanism?” Id. Here these authors identify issues that I have labeled
as Questions #1, 4, 5, and 8. In my view, they did not articulate all of the relevant
questions “that any coherent and comprehensive property theory must address.”
However, they recognized the value of identifying Property Law’s critical questions in
their project of search for a substantive theory of Property Law. See also Daniel Klein &
John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property Symposium, ECON
JOURNAL WATCH, Vol. 8, No. 3, 193, 195 (Sept. 2011), https://econjwatch.org/articles/propertya-bundle-of-rights-prologue-to-the-property-symposium [http://perma.cc/VDC2-A2ZZ]. Professors
Daniel Klein and John Robinson wrote:
In waving an exclusion banner, we mean . . . that exclusion or dominion is
central, even though it is not all that “property” signifies. The exclusion idea
does not itself provide the justification of property; nor speak to how unowned
things become property; nor clearly imply which things are amenable to
ownership (or propertization); nor clearly imply specific delimitations of
“exclusion,” “dominion,” or “messing with.”
In this quote, the authors acknowledge that the concept of exclusion does not address all
of the important questions of Property Law. And, they specify four additional issues. The
first question (the justification of a private property system) is not part of the framework
because it is a normative foundational issue which is assumed in the common law. The other
issues they identify correspond to Questions #1, 3, and 5 in the framework I have articulated.
103 I analyzed twenty-one Property casebooks to identify patterns in the structures
they use to organize the course. The following casebooks present topics completely or
substantially in the traditional order described: DUKEMINIER ET AL., CHASE & FORRESTER,
BURKE ET AL., BERNHARDT ET AL., NELSON ET AL., SPRANKLING ET AL., FREYERMUTH ET
AL., SMITH ET AL., MASSEY, KURTZ ET AL., BRUCE & ELY, CRIBBET ET AL., BARROS &
HEMINGWAY, supra note 24.
The following casebooks organize the course in a non-traditional order: CHUSED,
DWYER & MENELL, MERILL & SMITH, SINGER, CALLIES ET AL., CRUMP ET AL., FREYFOGLE &
KARKKAINEN, RABIN ET AL., supra note 24.
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between the questions in the framework and the topics included
in traditional Property Law casebook coverage.
Many casebooks begin with a section on “first acquisition,”
usually covering doctrines such as the Rule of Discovery, the
Right of Capture, and Acquisition by Creation. They then present
the Law of Finding, Adverse Possession, and the Law of Gift as
examples of “subsequent acquisition.” These topics and the section
headings more or less explicitly raise Questions #2 (types of property
interests), Question #3 (how acquired), and Question #4 (who owns
property) because the cases included in these sections present conflicting
claims of ownership in which that issue is resolved by courts’
decisions about what constitutes the required acts for acquisition
of that type of property.104 The Acquisition by Creation cases can
also raise Question #1 (is it a “property interest”).105 The Law of Gift
also concerns Question #6 (how to transfer property), and some
casebooks headings make this explicit.106 At this point, the traditional
casebook arrangement of topics presents Estates and Future Interests,
which address Questions #2 (types of property interests), Question #3
(how acquired), Question #5 (property rights entailed by ownership),
Question #7 (termination of property rights), and Question #8
(enforcement of property rights).107 Traditional coverage then moves

104 For capture, see Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 175 (N.Y. 1805); for acquisition by
creation, see Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); for rule of
finding, see Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (holding finder’s possession
grounds an ownership claim against subsequent possessors); for adverse possession, see
Mullis v. Winchester, 118 S.E.2d 61 (S.C. 1961); for gift, see Newman v. Bost, 29 S.E. 848
(N.C. 1898) (articulating and applying the rule that a gift causa mortis requires an
intention to make a gift and delivery). As discussed infra in notes 117–121 and
accompanying text, the M’Intosh case in the Rule of Discovery section covers additional
questions. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572 (1823).
105 See Moore, 793 P.2d 479 (considering whether a person can have “a sufficient legal
interest in his own bodily tissues amounting to personal property”).
106 See e.g., FREYERMUTH, ORGAN & NOBLE-ALLGIRE, supra note 24 (“Chapter 4.
Transferring Property by Gift”).
107 For Question #2, see Mahrenholz v. Cty. Bd. of Sch. Tr. of Lawrence Cty., 417
N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); for Question #5, see Baker v. Weedon, 262 So.2d 641 (Miss.
1972), characterized in FREYERMUTH, ORGAN & NOBLE-ALLGIRE, supra note 24, at 254
(“Rights and Duties of a Life Tenant (The Law of Waste)”); for Question #7, see
DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER & SCHILL, supra note 24, at 191 (“A fee simple may
endure forever; a life estate, for the life of a person; a term of years, for some period of
time measured by the calendar. . . . The estate system is designed to make clear who is
transferring what to whom—not just what physical parcel of land or item of personal
property, but also what sort of ownership, measured in duration of the transferee’s
interest.”); for Question #8, Woodrick v. Wood, 1994 WL 236287, at *2 (Oh. Ct. App. 1994)
(finding that the destruction of a barn on a life tenant’s estate does not constitute waste
and therefore does not violate the rights of future interest holders); see DUKEMINIER,
KRIER, ALEXANDER & SCHILL, supra note 24, at 223 (if the condition subsequent
incorporated into a fee simple determinable or fee simple subject to executory limitation is
violated, the holder of the future interest has an immediate right to possession); in
contrast, if the condition subsequent incorporated into a fee simple subject to condition
subsequent is violated, the holder of the future interest has a right to possess, but must
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to Concurrent Interests which raise Questions #2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8.108
The law of Landlord and Tenant, another complex set of doctrines
engaging Questions #2–8 generally follows.109 Next comes the law of
Servitudes, which implicates all of the questions.110 After Servitudes,
take affirmative action to gain possession. DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER & SCHILL,
supra note 24, at 224–25.
108 For Question #3, see DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER & SCHILL, supra note 24, at
319–21 (explicating creation requirements of tenancy in common, joint tenancy and
tenancy by the entirety); for Question #5, see DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER & SCHILL,
supra note 24, at 338 (stating rule that cotenants of tenancies in common and joint
tenancies have a unilateral right to partition, but cotenants in a tenancy by the entirety do
not); Spiller v. Mackereth, 334 So.2d 859 (Ala. 1976) (recognizing cotenant in possession has a
duty to not commit “ouster” against cotenant); for Question #6, see Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding, inter alia, that traditionally one could not validly
convey a property interest to oneself); for Question #7, see Riddle, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 530
(holding, inter alia, that a joint tenant can terminate a joint tenancy and destroy the right
of survivorship unilaterally by conveying to herself as a tenant in common); for Question
#8, see Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 1980) (enforcing traditional common law
rule favoring partition in kind over partition by sale); Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P.2d
73, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (holding cancelation of leases is not a remedy available to cotenant
when other joint tenant entered into the leases unilaterally and without her consent).
109 For Questions #2 and 7, see DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER & SCHILL, supra
note 24, at 421–23 (presenting three types of leasehold estates term of years, periodic
tenancy and tenancy at will) and requirements for notice to terminate; Garner v. Gerrish,
473 N.E.2d 229 (N.Y. 1984) (deciding “whether a lease . . . creates a determinable life
tenancy on behalf of the tenant or merely establishes a tenancy at will”); Ernst v. Conditt,
390 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (determining whether language in a lease
created an assignment or a sublease interest); for Question #5, see Hannan v. Dusch, 153
S.E. 824, 825 (Va. 1930) (considering “whether [in a lease] without an express covenant
there is nevertheless an implied covenant to deliver possession); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478
A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984) (holding that an implied warranty of habitability exists in every
residential lease); for Question #6, see DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER & SCHILL, supra
note 24, at 430 (stating rule that a lease creating an leasehold interest that will last
longer than a year must be in writing); for Question #8, see DUKEMINIER, KRIER,
ALEXANDER & SCHILL, supra note 24, at 465–81 (cases and discussion of landlord
remedies for defaulting tenants); Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 150–51 (Minn. 1978)
(holding “self-help” not available to landlords as remedy); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,
251 A.2d 268, 275 (N.J. 1969) (finding landlord breached covenant of quiet enjoyment
substantially and that tenant merited “constructive eviction” remedy).
110 For Questions #1 and 2, see DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER & SCHILL, supra
note 24, at 764 (“The law of servitudes is a study of how the tides of urbanization and the
demands of the market for efficient control of externalities swept around the artificial
barriers limiting one form of servitude and forced courts to recognize and develop other
forms.”); Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (recognizing an equitable
servitude as a property interest); for Question #3, see Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763,
764 (1976) (“As to the issue of estoppel, we have long recognized that a right to use of a
roadway over the lands of another may be established by estoppel”). In the servitude
context, Question #4 (who owns the property interest) is generally determined by an
answer to Question #3 (was a servitude created); for Question #5, see Raleigh Avenue
Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112, 123–24 (2005) (defining the scope of
public rights under the public trust doctrine). See generally Preseault v. U.S., 100 F.3d
1525 (1996) (considering scope of easements). For Question #6, see Willard v. First Church
of Christ, Scientist, 498 P.2d 987, 991 (1972) (holding that a grant may reserve an interest
in an easement in a third party); Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass’n, 200 A.646,
652 (1938) (holding that easements in gross can be assigned by a grant). For Question #7,
see Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1556 (finding that certain easements have terminated by
abandonment). For Question #8, Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1556 (finding that the U.S.
government is subject to a takings claim); Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 518 (1986)
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most casebooks cover land transactions, zoning, eminent domain,
and regulatory takings, topics that primarily involve statutory
and constitutional law except for the doctrine of nuisance.
The framework includes all of the various topics, but not every
question applies to every topic.111 The Law of Capture focuses on
Questions #2 (types of property interests), Question #3 (how acquired),
and Question #4 (who owns the property).112 Coverage of Estates and
Future Interests primarily addresses Question #2 (types of property
interests), Question #3 (how created/acquired), Question #4 (property
rights entailed by ownership), Question #6 (termination of property
rights), and Question #7 (enforcement of property rights).113 As
explained in note 110 supra, the Law of Servitudes requires
consideration of all of the questions, except Question #4 (who owns
the property).
B.

The Relationships Among the Questions Can Be Complex
The questions have their own complexity. They are conceptually
distinct, but in practice are often interrelated. The questions are
all interdependent and are not serial. Often courts will answer
one question which is the primary legal issue presented in a case
by answering one or more other questions. There is not a one-to-one
relationship between a question and a property doctrine. Some
doctrines (e.g., adverse possession and servitudes) involve several
questions; others (e.g., finding) only involve a few. The answer to

(denying injunction despite misuse of easement). Note that Appendix A demonstrates that
all of the doctrinal material covered in the servitudes section of PROPERTY comfortably fits
into the proposed framework of questions.
111 For example, the requirements for a valid transfer of a property interest (Question
#6) are not usually covered in the Law of Finding because they do not arise in that context.
112 For example, while the procedural posture of Pierson v. Post is an appeal from a
nonsuit, the property law question is “whether Lodowick Post, by the pursuit with his
hounds in the manner alleged in his declaration, acquired . . . a right to, or property in,
the fox . . . .”). Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). Similarly, the property
issue in Ghen v. Rich is whether Ghen “claims title to the whale” by virtue of the
prevailing whaling customs. Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 160 (D.C. Mass. 1881). Popov v.
Hayashi concerns contested claims between attendees for a baseball in a stadium. Popov
v. Hayashi, 2002 WL 31833731, at *1–3 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002).
113 See, e.g., White v. Brown 559 S.W.2d 938, 941 (1977) (finding will created a fee
simple absolute rather than a life estate); Baker v. Weedon, 262 So. 2d 641, 644 (1972)
(finding life estate holder can force future interest holders to sell, i.e. terminate their
property rights in land); Mahrenholz v. Cty. Bd. of Sch. Tr. of Lawrence Cty., 417 N.E.2d
138, 145 (1981) (holding that a deed created a fee simple determinable followed by a
possibility of reverter); Alby v. Banc One Fin., 128 P.3d 81, 84 (2006) (holding that deed
conveyed a fee simple determinable with an enforceable restraint on alienation); Kost v.
Foster, 94 N.E.2d 302, 304 (1950) (“The principal question involved is whether or not the
interest of Oscar Durant Kost was a vested remainder at the time of the purported sale by
the trustee in bankruptcy.”). Estates are largely defined by how they are created
(Question #3) and how long they last/how they can be terminated (Question #7).
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one question may tend to provide a particular answer to another
question, but they are not determinative.114
Property Law includes a wide variety of doctrines and rules.
These doctrines and rules are all answers to the property
questions, but there are several distinct ways that doctrines and
rules function as answers. Some doctrines or rules respond
directly to one of the primary questions for a particular type of
property, e.g., the elements for a valid inter-vivos transfer of real
property addresses Question #6 (requirements for valid transfer).
Other rules are elemental in the sense that they provide part of
an answer to a question, e.g., horizontal privity rules provide
part of what is required to create a Real Covenant (Question #3).
Yet other doctrines are instrumental; they assist the court in
answering certain other questions. For example, courts apply the
Rules Against Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation and the
Rule Against Perpetuities to decide whether to enforce a
grantor’s intended conditions in order to determine what
property interests have been created by a grant, ultimately
addressing Questions #2 and 3 (types of property interests and
how acquired).
Of course, not every case addresses all of the questions.
Some cases straightforwardly concern one question. For example,
the narrow holding in Pierson v. Post technically only decides
that “mere pursuit” is insufficient to constitute “occupancy” of a
wild animal in a wasteland, and therefore does not give
acquisition. This holding creates a rule responding to Question
#3 (how acquired) which decides the underlying conflict in the
case, Question #4 (who owns the property).115 Others are
primarily about one question, but the consequence of resolving it
may answer other questions.116 For example, adverse possession
is ultimately about Question #4 (who owns the property), but the
application of the doctrine to any given set of facts in a case gives
an answer to Question #2 (types of property interests), to
Question #3 (how acquired), and to Question #7 (termination).
Some particularly complex cases, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh,
engage numerous questions. While the stated issue in that case

114 Some libertarians consider the identification of a property interest in Question #2
to essentially determine the answers to Questions #5 and 8, thus conflating these three
questions, but courts have held them to be distinct.
115 Post, 3 Cai. at 175. The broader holding offers a complete rule for “occupancy.”
116 For example, in the Mahrenholz case, the issue before the court is Question #4,
but to answer that question it needs to answer Questions #3 and #6. See generally
Mahrenholz, 417 N.E.2d.
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sounded in Question #5117 (the scope of the Native American’s
right to transfer property), the ultimate issue in this action for
ejectment was Question #4: who owned the land as between the
plaintiffs (who traced their title to two grants from Native
American tribes) and the defendants (who traced their title to a
government patent). The Court’s path to answering that question
began by justifying the “Rule of Discovery” as a rule for acquiring
property interests (Question #3),118 then elaborating the specific
property rights entailed by title/ownership by discovery
(Question #5),119 then tracing the chain of title of the disputed
lands from Cabot’s discovery of the continent of North America to
the defendants (Question #6).120 Finally, comparing defendants’
title to plaintiffs’ title, the Court held that “the plaintiffs do not
exhibit a title which can be sustained in the Courts of the United
States” (Question #6) because the property interest owned by the
Native Americans did not include a broad right of transfer, so
their purported transfer of a fee interest was invalid.121 Therefore
the Court recognized defendants as the owners of the disputed
land (Question #4).
This framework of questions articulates the primary legal
issues which courts address in Property Law cases. All of the
common law cases, doctrines, and rules in Property Law
casebooks fit into this framework of questions. Therefore, this
framework of questions provides a relatively simple but
comprehensive structure within which all property doctrines can
be encompassed. Admittedly, this is a strong claim. I am not
suggesting that there are no interpretative issues. There could be
debates over which questions are (or should be) raised in any
particular case. And there could be debates about how the
questions are interrelated. (To be clear, I am not arguing that the
ordering of the questions presented in this essay has any
significance.) However, I contend that these debates would not

117 “The inquiry, therefore, is, in a great measure, confined to the power of Indians to
give, and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the Courts of
this country.” Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572 (1823). The Court first states that
“the question is, whether this title can be recognized in the Courts of the United States?”
Id. at 572. The underlying issue of the authority of U.S. Courts to recognize a title by
Native Americans that would be inconsistent with that claimed by the U.S. government is
not a “property law” issue, but rather a constitutional and, at the time, a practical issue.
118 Id. at 572–80.
119 Discoverers gained an exclusive right to appropriate the land occupied by Native
Americans either by purchase or by conquest as well as the right to convey its title subject
only to the Native American right of occupancy. The Native Americans only had a right of
occupancy, and, impliedly, a right to transfer their title in that interest only to the U.S.
government or its authorized representative. Id. at 587.
120 Id. at 576.
121 Id. at 604–05.
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identify different or additional primary doctrinal questions that
the courts actually answer.
For example, Professor Singer argues (and I agree) that
“systemic and distributive norms” are inherent in our property
system.122 Issues related to these norms are raised and resolved
by courts through answering one or more of the questions in the
framework. For example, antidiscrimination norms typically find
their expression in courts’ decisions about what rights are
entailed in ownership, Question #5. When courts address
distribution of property assets or wealth issues, they do so via
answers to the questions in the framework. Allocation and
distribution of property interests or property rights is often a
result of application of the rule but usually not directly the object
of the rule.123 In contrast, the marital property doctrines jure
uxoris estate, curtesy, and dower are the most prominent
common law rules dealing directly with distribution of assets. In
this context of the special relationship of marriage, the courts
distribute property assets by answering Question #2 and #5.124
Similarly, when courts decide cases in which property rights
conflict with other kinds of rights (e.g., the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech), courts construe and resolve this conflict through
deciding one or more of the questions in the framework. For example,
in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,125 the California Supreme
Court interpreted its state constitution to require that the shopping
center owner allow individuals to enter its property to collect
signatures for a political petition. The court resolved this conflict by

122 JOSEPH SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 140–78 (2000)
(“Some of the most important sets of rules in property law serve to ensure that the
property system as a whole operates well.”).
123 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 254 (1970) (finding that government
benefits were “property” (answering Question #1) effected a significant redistribution of
property rights); United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1264 (6th Cir.
1980) (finding that workers’ longstanding relationship with U.S. Steel did not create a
recognizable property right (answering Question #1) and prevented a redistribution of
property rights).
124 One could argue that Property law courts should address issues of allocation and
distribution of property assets directly, for example by inquiring: “Is this distribution of
property fair/efficient/etc. . . ?” perhaps as an element in a rule deciding Question #4,
(Does one claimant already have enough property or does the other claimant lack some
essential property?) Currently, there are few, if any, cases denominated as 1L “Property
law” cases which ask these questions. The closest perhaps are nuisance cases in which
Law and Economic scholars would urge courts to assign entitlements to parties based
upon economic efficiency. Questions like these appear in property-related courses, such as
Antitrust Law which concern systemic issues. Of course, other non-Property laws (e.g.,
marriage) also determine access to property assets. See, e.g., U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 12
(2013) (holding that the limitation of “marriage” and “spouse” in federal law to
heterosexual unions by Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) is
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
125 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80–81 (1980).
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finding that state-protected rights of free expression and petition
limited the shopping center’s right to exclude, a response to
Question #5.126
IV. HOW TO USE THE FRAMEWORK IN THE CLASSROOM
A.

One Professor’s Experience
I want to teach Property Law in a manner that offers its
diversity and complexity so that students can enjoy the variety
and intellectual stimulation without becoming unnecessarily
confused or overwhelmed. A few years ago, I started offering this
framework to my students as a consistent structure that students
can then apply to differing doctrinal areas, as an overlay to the
topic structure the casebook offered. Many students appreciated
it. Since then I have used this framework as a regular reference
point during the course to help my students orient the topics,
doctrines, and cases, and to offer a structure which they can use
to get their arms around the course.
As part of the first assignment in my Property course, I
require the students to write brief answers to a version of the
questions in the framework before they do any reading.127 I
reassure them that this is not a “test” but rather a means to help
them recognize what they already know about Property Law.
Pedagogically, I am also attempting to “implant” these questions
for their consideration during the course. Year after year,
students’ answers demonstrate that these questions are familiar
as “Property Law” questions even to non-lawyers because even
without any particular context they regularly mention the same
property law doctrines and rules as answers to the same questions.128
During the course, when we begin to consider a case I often
ask: What property question(s) does this case address? I hope to
train the students to perform this exercise themselves. The
questions and this practice help the students orient themselves
to a case, anchor a case in the framework, and relate the cases
(doctrines and rules) across topics.

126 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908–11 (1979) aff'd sub nom.
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. 74. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held
that the California Supreme Court’s holding did not constitute a regulatory taking under
the federal constitution. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980).
127 Following are the questions students are required to answer: (1) What is “property”?;
(2) What is not “property”?; (3) What does it mean to “own” property?; (4) How do we know
who is the “owner” of property?; (5) What is a “property right”?; (6) Do property owners
have any “duties” or obligations by virtue of their property ownership? If so, what duties
and to whom?; (7) Why do we (society and courts) recognize and enforce “property rights”?
128 For example, many students will identify “people” as an answer to “what is not
property?” noting that chattel slavery was outlawed; or they will mention air or planets.
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Periodically during the course, I provide students with a
handout that tracks which questions we have studied for each
topic or doctrine.129 At the end of the course, I invite students to
revisit their first essays to take stock of what they have learned.
And, I offer the framework of questions as a supplement to the
traditional exam outline organized by the topics.
B.

Why Use This Framework in Your Course?
Most casebooks use some of these questions to organize part
of the course, and use other means (primarily doctrines or topics)
to organize the remainder. The framework of questions is an
additional organizing tool that professors can use. This
framework solves the first teaching problem (perceived lack of
connection between property doctrines and rules) and provides
substantial assistance for the second one (perceived lack of unity
in Property policy and theory). It also contributes to helping
students integrate legal analysis with legal practice.
Laying out the questions all together in a list offers a
conceptual container for Property doctrine. It demonstrates that
there are not an unlimited number of issues (just as there are not
an unlimited number of property interests). The framework of
questions demonstrates that property law is not disparate by
demonstrating its connectedness via the questions courts ask and
answer. It provides useful grips.130 This reduces unnecessary
anxiety, confusion, and distraction among students.
When students use the questions, they can read and understand
cases more efficiently since the questions provide analytical clarity,
allowing them to follow the court’s reasoning because they understand
what question the court is answering.131
In addition, the framework provides an easy entry into policy
and theory questions and encourages a critical perspective. Knowing
the questions suggests points of comparison and contrast instead
of seeing rules and doctrines in isolation as unconnected. When
students see that several rules are only different answers to the same
questions in different contexts/topics, they instinctively inquire:
See Appendix B: Where Are We Now?
The best-selling Property Law casebook, PROPERTY, by Dukeminier, Krier,
Alexander & Schill (8th ed. 2010) covers servitudes in Part V of the book called “Land Use
Controls” in a section entitled “Private Land Use Controls: The Law of Servitudes.” This
is perfectly reasonable and makes sense in terms of grouping the topics and doctrines.
Yet, it would be helpful to students, and would not compromise any pedagogical
objectives, to also point out that these doctrines are responsive to the same set of
questions as the Law of Finding or Estates and Future Interests. Appendix A tracks the
doctrinal material covered in the servitudes section of PROPERTY and demonstrates that it
comfortably fits into the proposed framework of questions.
131 See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572 (1823).
129
130
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why use rule A to answer Question #2 in that topic but rule B to
answer the same question in another topic? Seeing the troubles
courts have in answering questions raises policy and theory questions,
e.g., the relationship of property rights to each other (Question #5).
Students see that the different rules are informed by different
policies/theories/purposes and contexts, e.g., efficiency or fairness.
And they see how they can change over time, so they appreciate
the dynamism of property. The framework helps students integrate
legal analysis with legal practice because starting with the
questions that Property Law addresses places students in the
place where their future clients will be—asking questions about
how to accomplish a task or solve a problem. For example, what
do I need to do to transfer my house to my daughter? Does my
neighbor have a right to let her tree grow over my property?
This framework is pedagogically useful because it is comprehensive,
coherent, neutral, educationally fertile, and versatile.
It is comprehensive because it organizes all of the common
law doctrines and can be applied to every case. Some cases
address only one or two questions; others address several
questions. While there can be legitimate debates about which
questions in the framework a particular case addresses, no case
addresses a different or additional question that is not included
in the framework.
The questions provide students with a coherent, stable
framework in which to discuss and debate the full range of
competing policy perspectives. Students can appreciate how each
policy perspective leads to a different set of answers to the same
basic Property Law questions.132 When a professor provides
several policy perspectives, or regularly references policy
arguments without an intervening framework to relate the policy
perspectives, students might find it difficult, like comparing
apples to oranges. The questions provide a structure within
which students can compare and contrast answers to the
questions, and see which questions are ignored or de-emphasized
by one policy perspective compared to another.
This framework of questions is neutral; it does not take a
position on any of the critical issues in Property theory, e.g.,
whether property rights are natural rights or positivist or what
scope of individual protection ownership of property confers. The
framework only surfaces and makes explicit the legal questions
that courts are regularly called upon to answer—and must
132 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 531, 531 (2005) (arguing that coherent policy perspectives have a general answer to
all of the questions or at least offer principles and values by which to answer them).
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answer—in Property Law.133 The mere articulation of this
framework suggests that several positions can be taken on each
issue. The questions, in effect, mediate between theoretical
conflicts and doctrine.
The approach is educationally fertile. Given that Property is
a first year fundamental course, Property professors may want to
both teach the students to “think like a lawyer,” and teach
doctrine and policy. Using the framework of questions, we can do
both because the framework links obscure property doctrines to
the fundamental structure of legal issues which courts address.
In service to a common pedagogical goal in first year courses, the
framework increases students’ tolerance for ambiguity and offers
opportunities to teach advocacy skills. Moreover, it teaches
students to think in terms of overarching structure, rather than
merely content—a push toward abstract thinking that is critical
to higher, more theoretical applications of the law.
The framework of questions sets the stage in which
important interpretative issues can be raised and engaged.
Further, the framework of questions together with policy
arguments and policy perspectives provides opportunities for
students to advocate for certain rules over others as well as to
explore the policy reasons for the development of the rules. Two
advocates (or students) working from the same set of facts can
argue that they raise different questions demonstrating the
strategic importance of framing issues.134 This approach helps
students make sense of Property in the context of first year
“foundational” courses focused on teaching the common law—learning
law as it emerges from lawsuits—because it can demonstrate how
effective lawyering includes successful framing of an issue to the
court, and how courts exercise discretion in framing disputes by
selecting which question(s) they will decide.
This approach is also versatile. It can be employed with any
casebook and any teaching style or approach to Property Law—any
133 This argument is consistent with the view that property law is an ongoing social
conversation. See Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean
Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L.
1095 (1996); Steven J. Eagle, The Really New Property: A Skeptical Appraisal, 43 IND. L.
REV. 1229 (2010) (contrasting “imposed top-down social change with Burkean and
Oakeshottian gradual change derived from conversation with our legal and cultural
tradition”). On this metaphor, this essay specifies the subject matter of that conversation
when it is conducted in the courts. In particular, it articulates the questions that courts
are regularly asked to answer in this legal conversation.
134 For example, in State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297 (N.J. 1971), the issue is usually
discussed as a dispute about the “scope” of the right to exclude. However, Mr. Tedesco (the
plaintiff) could be understood to be arguing like the plaintiff in Jacque v. Steenberg
Homes, Inc., 563 N.W. 2d.154 (Wis. 1997), that anything less than an unlimited right to
exclude is no right to exclude at all.
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variation on the Socratic method, problem-based course, practical
lawyering based courses as well as more conceptual or theoretical
approaches. It allows professors to continue to select which topics
they will teach in the time available without sacrificing coherence.
There are an abundance of difficult problems, doctrines, and
rules in Property Law that students must struggle to understand
and apply to novel fact situations. While the framework avoids
some unnecessary confusion, it does not simplify or wring the
difficulty out of Property Law. In fact, the framework actually
makes this complexity and uncertainty manifest. It merely
provides a useful structure upon which to hang the difficulties.
CONCLUSION
This essay argues that even though Property theory is
thoroughly contested, law professors can offer students a
coherent structure for learning the doctrines and rules of
Property Law. For purposes of teaching, the questions provide a
structure for understanding the issues Property Law addresses.
Without a framework students can get lost in the thicket of
topics, doctrines, and rules.
Using the framework of questions presented in this essay,
Property professors can orient students to the course, particular
doctrines, and rules. Then they can use the questions as a
regular point of reference for students to link doctrines and topics
together. Further, they can demonstrate how different policy
perspectives would approach and answer a particular question in
a given case, and explore deeper theoretical issues.
Students can use these sets of questions to organize the
issues, doctrines, and rules while keeping open to—indeed
revealing in pedagogically helpful ways—the arenas of
contemporary conflict in Property Law. The framework of
questions creates a conceptual “tree” upon which students can
hang doctrines and rules and explore controversies.
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Appendix A: Comparing Coverage of
Servitudes in Dukeminier, Krier, Alexander,
and Shill, PROPERTY (7th ed.) with the
Framework of Questions
Dukeminier et al., PROPERTY

Questions

Easements
Historical Background and Some Terminology

Q #1 & 2

Creation of Easements
•

Willard

•

Holbrook

•

Van Sandt

•

Othen

•

Raleigh Avenue

Assignability of Easements
•

Miller

Scope of Easements
•

Brown

Termination of Easements
•

Preseault

Negative Easements
Conservation and Other Novel Easements

Q #3

Q #5
Q #5 & 8
Q #7
Q #1
Q #1, 2 & 3

Covenants Running with the Land
Historical Background (RC and EE)
•

Tulk

Creation of Covenants
•

Sanborn

Validity and Enforcement of Covenants
•

Neponsit

Discriminatory Covenants
•

Shelley

Q #1 & 2
Q #3
Q #8
Q #5

Termination of Covenants
•

Western Land

•

Rick

•

Pocono

Q #7

Common Interest Communities
•

Nahrstedt

•

40 West 67th Street Corp.

Q #5 & 8
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Appendix B: Where Are We Now? Handout
PROPERTY LAW
PROFESSOR IGLESIAS
Where Are We Now?
In our first class, we discussed the eight sets of questions
that courts regularly answer in property law cases. This handout
categorizes the property doctrines we are learning by reference to
the primary questions we will cover when we learn that doctrine.
1.

Is there a “property interest” at issue?
• Servitudes

2.

If it is property, what “type of property interest” is it?
• Rule of Discovery
• Doctrine of Adverse Possession
• Estates & Future Interests
• Concurrent Interests
• Landlord-Tenant
• Servitudes

3.

How is this type of property interest created or acquired?
• Rule of Discovery
• Doctrine of Adverse Possession
• Estates & Future Interests
• Concurrent Interests
• Landlord-Tenant
• Servitudes

4. Who “owns” the property interest? How are competing
ownership claims decided?
• Rule of Discovery
• Law of Capture
• Law of Finding
• Doctrine of Adverse Possession
• Recording Acts
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5. What “property rights” does ownership in this property
entail, and with what limits/scope and duties?
• Rule of Discovery
• Estates & Future Interests
• Concurrent Interests
• Landlord-Tenant
• Servitudes
• Regulatory Takings
6. What is required to make a valid transfer of this property
interest?
• Law of Gift
• Deeds
7. How long does the property interest last? How can the
property interest be terminated?
• Doctrine of Adverse Possession
• Estates & Future Interests
• Concurrent Interests
• Landlord-Tenant
• Servitudes
• Power of Eminent Domain
• Regulatory Takings
8.

How are property rights in this kind of property enforced?
• Estates & Future Interests
• Concurrent Interests
• Landlord-Tenant
• Servitudes
• Power of Eminent Domain
• Regulatory Takings

